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ENERGY LITIGATION UPDATE 2018 
MARK D. CHRISTIANSEN* 
 
I. Non-Operator v. Operator and Other Oil 
and Gas Operations- Related Cases 
A. Assignor sues working interest owners for failure to comply with 
contractual obligation under 1994 assignment to notify assignor of any 
future plans to plug the subject well.  
In American Star Energy and Minerals Corporation v. Armor Petroleum, 
Inc.,1 Armor appealed from the trial court’s judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, American Star, in this breach of contract action. The key 
controversy in this case was whether the defendant-lessees were obligated, 
under a provision of an assignment, to notify American Star of the proposal 
and plan to plug the subject well and also offer American Star the 
opportunity to purchase defendants’ interests in lieu of plugging the well.  
More specifically, the well at issue was located within the Rice Morrow 
Sand Formation unitized field established under OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 
287.1 et seq. The Plan of Unitization became effective December 1, 1994. 
Some years later, the decision was made to plug the well. The unit sent 
notice of such intent to all lessees of the Rice Morrow Sand Formation. The 
                                                                                                                 
 * Edinger Leonard & Blakley PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This paper was 
originally presented, in substantially the same form, at the November 2018 Annual Eugene 
Kuntz Conference on Natural Resources Law and Policy. 
 1. 89 O.B.J. 548 (Okla. App. 2018 - #115,490) (Not for Publication). For the published 
Appellant’s brief and description of appeal, see American Star Energy and Minerals 
Corporation v. Armor Petroleum, Inc., 2017 WL 3926079 (Okla. 2017).  
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well was plugged and abandoned on December 3, 2009. The defendants, 
who were lessees of the unit and successors to the obligations under the 
assignment, did not notify American Star of the impending plugging of the 
well or afford American Star the opportunity to exercise its purchase option 
prior to the closure of the well.   
American Star filed this suit seeking damages for the cost of drilling a 
new well for purposes of developing a new formation. In their Answer, the 
defendants asserted (1) the unit, rather than the defendants, had control over 
the personal property of the well, and the unit should have been named in 
the lawsuit; (2) establishment of the unit abrogated and/or modified any 
rights, including notice rights, of American Star as to plugging and 
abandonment of the well; and (3) a contradictory finding would be an 
impermissible collateral attack on the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission’s order of unitization. 
Following a bench trial, the trial court held for American Star, finding 
the contractual obligations contained in the assignment were continuing, 
assumed by the defendants, and did not conflict with the unitization plan or 
statutes. American Star was awarded $200,000.00 in damages plus statutory 
interest at 5.5% calculated from June 6, 2016, until paid. The defendants 
appeal. In addressing certain of the key arguments of the defendants, the 
Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated in part as follows: 
1. The court agreed that the unit had no obligation to notify American 
Star of its intent to plug the well. The unit operator was only required to 
provide notice to lessees of the subject tract, and American Star was not a 
lessee.  
2. However, the defendants were obligated to provide notice to 
American Star pursuant to the terms of their assignment. Contrary to the 
assertion of the defendants, this contractual requirement in no manner 
conflicted with the notice requirements of the Plan of Unitization, or of the 
unitization statutes in general. The legal obligations under the assignment 
regarding the provision of notice by the defendants remained fully 
enforceable. 
3. Finally, the trial court did modify the portion of the trial court’s 
judgment that provided for interest at the rate of 5.5%2 until paid. The court 
found that the statutes providing for post-judgment interest would be 
adhered to by stating in the judgment that “[t]he judgment shall earn 
                                                                                                                 
 2. The statutory post judgment interest rate for 2016 was 5.5% under OKLA. STAT. tit. 
12, § 727.1 (2013). 
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statutory interest in accord with OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727.1 (2013) from 
June 6, 2016, until paid.”3 
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court correctly entered 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed 
as modified. 
For a lawsuit addressing disputes arising from informal oil and gas 
dealings and related tort claims among oil and gas entities and individuals, 
see Online Oil, Inc. v. CO&G Production Group, LLC.4 
II. Royalty Owner Litigation 
A. Court addresses continuing disputes as to scope of post-wellhead 
expenses that may be factored into the computation of gas royalty payments 
in Oklahoma.  
The final appellate decision in Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC 5 
(Pummill II) presented an appeal of the District Court’s declaratory 
judgment on the merits, following a bench trial, rejecting the oil and gas-
lessee defendants’ contention that they were allowed to proportionately 
charge certain expenses against the plaintiffs’ royalty interest payments. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he question of 
consequence on appeal involves Defendants’ challenge to the trial court’s 
determination of when the natural gas at issue here became a ‘marketable 
product.’”6 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in earlier proceedings in the case, 
Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC 7 (Pummill I), was presented with the 
defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s four 
lengthy summary judgment orders in favor of the plaintiffs, which had been 
affirmed by the court of appeals. The underlying lawsuit asserted that the 
defendants had underpaid royalties by reducing royalty payments by certain 
post-production expenses. The summary judgment orders were titled 
“Summary Judgment Issue 1—Lease Language; Summary Judgment Issue 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. ¶ 12. 
 4. 2018 OK CIV APP 1, 419 P.3d 337. 
 5. 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268. 
 6. 419 P.3d at 1270. The “marketable product” standard was recognized in the 
landmark Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Mittesltaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 
1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203. 
 7. 2014 OK 97, 341 P.3d 69. 
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II—Form of Contract; Summary Judgment Issue III—Fuel Gas; and 
Summary Judgment Issue IV—Interest.”8 
The defendant oil and gas companies asserted four primary issues on 
appeal: “Issue 1. The express language of their leases does not abrogate or 
negate the implied covenant to market in any way; Issue 2. The current or 
future use of a POP, POI or any other form of contract, instead of a fee 
based agreement with Enogex, does not change the amount of royalties due 
under the leases; Issue 3. Appellants are entitled to receive royalties on gas 
used off the lease or in the manufacture of products at the gas plant; and 
Issue 4. Appellants owe interest on royalties not timely paid without prior 
demand from the royalty owners.”9 
In an unusual step, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, on its own initiative, 
set the matter for oral argument at a hearing conducted on November 5, 
2014. At the hearing, the parties affirmed that Issue IV was not contested.10 
As to the other three issues, the court found that “[t]he briefs filed and the 
oral argument . . . reveal that facts which could affect the resolution of the 
district court Issues I through III need to be addressed before the fact-
finder, the district court.”11 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the court of appeals, 
affirmed the district court in part (as to Issue IV) and reversed the district 
court in part (as to Issues I, II and III). The case was remanded to the 
district court to hear evidence and decide the disputed fact issues. The 
rulings of the district court on remand, which favored the Pummill 
plaintiffs, are described in detail on pages 1272 and 1273 of the 2018 
appellate opinion in Pummill II.12 The defendants appealed the district 
court’s judgment on remand. Three amici curiae sought leave and were 
allowed to file briefs in support of the defendants. An additional two groups 
sought leave and were permitted to file amici curiae briefs in support of the 
royalty-owner plaintiffs. 
In affirming the district court’s judgment at the conclusion of the trial in 
favor of the Pummill Plaintiffs, the court held in part as follows: 
1. Regarding the standard of review in this appeal, the Oklahoma Court 
of Appeals found that the primary relief sought by Pummill, and ultimately 
by the defendants, “concerned their competing views of the point at which 
gas production from the well becomes a ‘marketable product’ for purposes 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 2018 OK CIV APP 48, ¶¶ 10-18, 419 P.3d at 1272 – 1273. 
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of calculating royalties due”13 under the leases. The court of appeals further 
observed that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized “that oil and 
gas leases are ‘contracts,’ and has characterized an oil and gas producer’s 
liability under a lease as ‘purely contractual’ in nature (citations 
omitted).”14 The court of appeals found “that there is a ‘presumption of 
correctness’ afforded to a trial court’s findings of fact, even if those 
findings were adopted by the court from written findings prepared by 
counsel [for proposed use by the court] with minimal changes. . . . This 
Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported 
by any competent evidence, including reasonable inferences derived from 
that evidence.”15 
2. The court of appeals found that “[t]he issue of when natural gas first 
becomes ‘marketable’ has been the source of much contention and 
consternation in both legal and oil and gas circles for several years.”16   
3. In summarizing certain legal principles, the court noted in paragraphs 
26, 27 and 28 of its opinion that a lessee has an implied duty to obtain a 
"marketable product," including the cost of preparing the gas for market 
and getting the gas to the place of sale in marketable form. As a general 
rule, the lessee may not deduct from royalty payments the costs of 
gathering, transportation, compression, dehydration, or blending if those 
costs are required to create a marketable product, unless the lease provides 
otherwise. The duty to market further includes the obligation to obtain the 
best price available. The lessee's obligation is not unlimited. In Mittelstaedt, 
where the court considered a "gross proceeds" lease, the court recognized 
that, although expenses to obtain marketable production are not chargeable 
against royalty, reasonable "post-production expenses" might be applied 
against the royalty if the expenses involve "enhancing the value" of an 
already marketable product, and the lessee shows that the expenditures 
resulted in a proportionate increase in royalty revenue. 17 Unfortunately, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mittelstaedt did not define the meaning of 
“marketable product,” nor has it done so since.18 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. ¶ 20. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. ¶ 21-22. 
 16. Id. ¶ 25. 
 17. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 
 18. Id. ¶ 28. 
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4. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the defendants 
failed to sustain their burden of proving that they were entitled to deduct 
proportionate post-production costs from royalties under Mittelstaedt.19 
5. The court of appeals stated that the defendants were urging the court 
to adopt a definition of “marketable” identical to that of the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas. In that 
decision, the court found that production is merchantable once the operator 
has put it into a condition acceptable to a purchaser in a good faith 
transaction.20 The defendants asserted that the gas at issue here was a 
marketable product at either or both (a) the custody meter, and (b) the 
wellhead where the defendants alleged the existence of hypothetical gas 
buyers.21 
6. Turning to the defendants’ assertion that the court should adopt the 
Kansas Supreme Court’s holding in Fawcett, the court concluded that 
Fawcett had limited application in the Pummill case for at least three 
reasons: (a) The first and most obvious reason, as noted by the court, was 
that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals is bound to follow Oklahoma 
precedent (citing Mittelsteadt and Wood which were found to clearly apply 
to this litigation); (b) second, the court of appeals found no wording in 
Fawcett suggesting that the Kansas Supreme Court intended to overturn 
what the court of appeals described as the existing rule that a lessee-
operator has the duty to make gas marketable and that it must do so free of 
cost for field services to royalty owners; and (c) Fawcett was factually 
distinguishable in that the first, actual sales of gas occurred at the 
wellhead, and the lease language clearly made reference to royalties 
measured by sales “at the mouth of the well” or “if sold at the well” in 
contrast to the “gross proceeds” language at issue here. That said, the court 
of appeals concluded that even if it used the definition of “marketable 
production” used in Fawcett, it would reach the same result under the 
circumstances presented in this case, pursuant to the court’s standard of 
review of whether the trial court’s decision was supported by competent 
evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on the 
marketability question.22 
7. The court of appeals stated that it found no error in the trial court’s 
finding that, in essence, the defendants could not employ “percentage of 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. ¶ 41. 
 20. Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 352 P.3d 1032 (Kan. 1994). 
 21. 2018 OK CIV APP 48, ¶29, 419 P.3d at 1276. 
 22. Id. ¶44. 
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proceeds” contracts23 simply in order to avoid the court’s decision 
prohibiting certain cost deductions from royalties.24 
8. Finally, with regard to the defendants’ argument that the ruling of the 
trial court would have wide-ranging, destructive ramifications for the oil 
and gas industry, the court of appeals found that this argument exaggerated 
the extent to which the issue presented to the court could be applied outside 
the limited realm of this case, and also ignored the requirements 
Mittelstaedt places on lessees in the position of the defendants. The court 
noted that this was the case particularly in the omission to recognize that 
the defendants did not present evidence going to each of the elements of 
Mittelstaedt.25  
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the 
plaintiff royalty owners. 
B. Court of Appeals reverses certification of class of royalty owners.  
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Whisenant v. Strat Land Exploration 
Co.,26 reversed a decision of the District Court of Beaver County certifying 
a royalty owner class. Whisenant sued Strat Land alleging, on behalf of a 
proposed class of similarly situated royalty owners, the underpayment or 
non-payment of royalties on natural gas and its constituents from certain 
Oklahoma wells. The evidence showed that the putative class included 
approximately eighty-eight Oklahoma wells and approximately 1,000 
royalty owners throughout the United States.27 The proposed class wells 
were located within, or adjacent to, Ellis, Harper, Beaver and Texas 
Counties.28 
Whisenant asserted that one of the issues of law and fact common to the 
proposed class was “whether gas [is] in Marketable Condition at the meter 
run/gathering line inlet”.29 He additionally argued, among other issues, that 
Strat Land paid royalty to him and to the proposed class using a common 
method based on the net revenue Strat Land received under its marketing 
contracts rather than paying royalties based on the gross amount received 
                                                                                                                 
 23. The court also referred to “PIP” contracts which were not defined in the opinion.  Id. 
¶ 45. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. ¶ 47. 
 26. 2018 OK CIV APP 65, 429 P.3d 703.  
 27. Id. ¶ 15 n.11.  
 28. Id. ¶ 2. 
 29. Id. ¶ 3. 
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by the midstream purchaser from its sale of the gas at interstate or intrastate 
markets.30 
The district court certified a class, subject to a series of exclusions not 
described below, consisting of all royalty owners in Oklahoma wells that:  
(a) [were] operated by [Strat Land]; (b) marketed by Strat Land 
to DCP Midstream (f/k/a Duke Energy Field Services)’ and (c) 
that have produced gas and/or gas constituents (such as residue 
gas, natural gas liquids, helium, or condensate) from February 
12, 2009 to the time Class Notice is given31 
The district court granted class certification under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 
2023(B)(3). Strat Land filed an interlocutory appeal of the class 
certification order.32 
The court of appeals observed that the primary issue on appeal is 
whether there are common questions of law or fact. However, since the 
class was certified below under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3), the court 
noted the additional requirement that common issues predominate over 
other questions. The court stated, early in its discussion, that “[i]n the 
present case, class certification is inappropriate because a ‘highly 
individualized’ review of the facts pertaining to each of the numerous wells 
is necessary.”33 In concluding that the lower court’s order granting class 
certification should be reversed, certain of the key findings of the court of 
appeals included the following: 
First, the court found that the standards in Oklahoma for determining 
whether certain types of post-production costs may be deducted in the 
computation of gas royalty payments, as recognized in the landmark case of 
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,34 require a fact-intensive inquiry. 
That the trial court found “that Strat Land had a common corporate policy 
of not paying royalty on the gross value of the gas produced under the 
leases”35 was insufficient to satisfy the predominance requirement of OKLA. 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. ¶ 4. 
 31. Id. ¶ 5.  
 32. Under Oklahoma state court procedure, an order granting or denying class 
certification is “subject to a de novo standard of review by any appellate court reviewing the 
order.”  12 OKLA. STAT. SUPP. 2014 § 2023(C)(2). 
 33. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals cited in support of this conclusion its earlier 
decision in Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2017 OK CIV APP 53, ¶ 32, 405 P.3d 131, cert. 
denied.   
 34. 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203.  
 35. Id. ¶ 12. 
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STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3).36 Rather, in discussing the complex analysis of 
determining whether the costs deducted in the computation of gas royalties 
were expenses necessary to make the gas a marketable product, the court of 
appeals stated that “highly individualized and fact-intensive review of each 
Class Members’ claim would be necessary to determine if [the defendant] 
underpaid oil or gas royalties.”37 
Second, as a consequence of the above, the court of appeals rejected 
Whisenant’s contention that “[c]lass action treatment will allow a large 
number of similarly situated individuals to prosecute their common claims 
in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without duplication of 
time, expense and effort on the part of those individuals, witnesses, the 
courts and/or [Strat Land].”38 The court was likewise unpersuaded by 
Whisenant’s contention that disposing of the case as a class action would 
“avoid the possibility of inconsistent and/or varying results in this matter 
arising out of the same facts.”39 
Third, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals declined Whisenant’s assertion 
that “determination of the quality of gas and other facts pertinent to each 
well are susceptible to generalized proof.”40   
Fourth, the appellate court rejected the use of assumptions parallel to 
those used in the case of Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,41 finding: 
[A]n assumption analogous to that forwarded by the employees 
in Tyson—i.e., an assumption that, for each gas well within the 
proposed class, the royalty-valuation point and deductible costs 
can be set at the same average point and amount — is 
unwarranted. 42  
The court concluded that a class-wide determination based either on the 
variables as they exist with Whisenant’s one well “or on an average 
sampling (i.e., of gas quality, proximity of interstate pipelines, availability 
                                                                                                                 
 36. The court of appeals cited EQT Production Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 
2014) (“Even a plethora of identical practices will not satisfy the predominance requirement 
if the defendants’; common conduct has little bearing on the central issue in the litigation – 
in this case, whether the defendants underpaid royalties.”) 
 37. Citing Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2017 OK CIV APP 53, ¶ 32, 405 P.3d 131, and 
Foster v. Apache Corp., 285 F.R.D. 632, 638 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
 38. Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 16, 429 P.3d at 710 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. ¶ 17. 
 41. 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016). 
 42. Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 20, 429 P.3d at 710-11. 
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and proximity of processing plants, market realities, and so forth) would 
result in distorted and inconsistent awards to the various members of the 
class.”43 Citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Marez,44 the court noted that “a 
judgment must be based upon evidence that establishes essential facts as 
probably, not merely possibly being true.”45 
Fifth, the court of appeals found “[a] reliance upon facts derived from 
other wells would be as impermissible as it would have been to determine 
liability in Wal-Mart based upon generalized evidence derived from other 
store managers.”46 The court of appeals rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that 
class action certification was appropriate here based on their contention that 
the case would rely on admissible expert testimony to prove class-wide 
liability. 
Finally, the court held that, even if Strat Land paid royalties to the 
members of the putative class using a common method, “the establishment 
of this common fact fails to resolve the issue of liability, an issue which 
remains individual rather than common.”47 The court specifically rejected 
Whisenant’s contention that the alleged common method was either right or 
wrong, class-wide. 
Concluding that the predominance and superiority requirements for class 
certification under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3) were not satisfied in 
this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting class 
certification. Whisenant’s subsequent petition for certiorari review by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court was denied by order issued on October 1, 2018.  
Mandate was issued on October 31, 2018. 
III. Oil and Gas Lease Cancellation, Termination and Breach of Obligation 
Cases (Other Than Royalty) 
A. Oklahoma Supreme Court resolves oil and gas lease termination claims, 
the “capability” doctrine and related legal principles. 
The case of Hall v. Galmor,48 presented the appeal of the trial court’s 
judgment, after a bench trial, denying the appellants’ petition to cancel oil 
and gas leases of the appellee. “Between the years 1954 and 2008, the 
predecessors-in-interest [to Galmor] entered into 30 oil and gas leases 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. ¶ 21. 
 44. 1996 OK CIV APP 137, ¶ 8, 931 P.2d 760. 
 45. Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 16, 429 P.3d at 711. 
 46. Id. ¶ 22. 
 47. Id. ¶ 23. 
 48.  2018 OK 59, 427 P.3d 1052.  
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covering mineral interests in lands located in Beckham County, 
Oklahoma.”49 All 30 leases contained habendum clauses that made the 
leases valid for primary terms lasting between 90 days and 10 years, and 
then for secondary terms thereafter lasting as long as oil or gas was 
“produced” from the leased premises.50 Some 29 of the leases also 
contained “cessation of production” clauses that gave the lessee a grace 
period ranging between 60 days and 6 months during which to re-establish 
production either by reworking the existing well or by drilling a new well.51 
Galmor’s predecessors-in-interest drilled seven wells during the primary 
terms of the leases. Those wells were located on lands covered by fourteen 
of the 30 leases at issue. The lands covered by two of the fourteen leases 
were also subject to voluntary pooling agreements with lands covered by 
six more leases on which no wells had been drilled. The lands covered by 
the remaining ten leases did not have completed wells and were not 
otherwise held under a voluntary pooling agreement or a statutory spacing 
unit. During the secondary terms of the fourteen leases on which wells had 
been drilled, six of the seven wells actually produced oil and gas. Some of 
the wells drilled prior to the 1990’s ceased production for a number of years 
during that decade, but afterwards attained their previous production 
levels.52 
Writer’s Note: The 36-page opinion in the Hall case (when viewed on 
the OSCN website) contains multiple pages describing the factual and 
procedural background in this factually-complex lawsuit.  The readers are 
referred to that opinion for a description of the additional facts and history 
of the case. In the interest of brevity, this summary of the Hall decision will 
now move to a description of some of the many rulings in the case.  
In May 2016, at the conclusion of a two-day bench trial, the trial court 
issued judgment against Hall on his lease termination claims and other 
claims. The district court relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s prior 
decision in Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,53 where the court held that a 
lease will continue as long as the well is capable of production in paying 
quantities subject, of course, to any violations of any other express 
provisions such as the shut-in royalty clause or implied covenants such as 
the covenant to market. The trial court also relied upon James Energy Co. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. ¶ 1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 53. 1994 OK 23, ¶ 21, 869 P.2d 323, 329. 
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HCG Energy Corp.,54 where the court held that “the lessor must demand 
that an implied covenant be complied with before a court of equity will 
grant a forfeiture” and that “the lessor, not a stranger to the lease . . . , must 
make demand on the lessee to comply with the implied covenants.”55 
The trial court specifically found that all seven of the wells at issue were 
capable of producing in paying quantities during the period they were shut 
in, and that no demand to comply with implied covenants was made by the 
royalty owners to the lessees. Hall appealed the trial court’s judgment to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court which retained the appeal. In affirming in part, 
and reversing in part, the judgment of the trial court, some of the pertinent 
rulings of the court were as follows: 
1. Hall argued on appeal that, in order for a well to be “capable” of 
producing in paying quantities, “the well must be maintained in turn-key 
condition such that it will produce in paying quantities immediately upon 
being turned ‘on.’”56 The court found that this proposed definition was first 
announced by the Texas Court of Appeals in a 1993 decision.57 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court had earlier stated that “the characteristic that 
distinguishes a ‘shut-in’ well from a wells experiencing a ‘cessation of 
production’” is that the well is “capable” of production in paying quantities 
in the first situation.58 In assessing whether a well is “capable” of producing 
in paying quantities, the court ruled that the relevant time period to be 
considered is the moment prior to the shutting-in of the well. “So long as 
the well was complete and was producing in paying quantities when it was 
shut in, the well remains ‘capable’ and the habendum clause in the leases 
remains satisfied throughout the shut-in period.”59 The court affirmed the 
trial court’s rejection of Hall’s proposal that Oklahoma courts adopt the 
Texas rule and require operators to continually maintain their shut-in wells 
in turn-key condition.60 
2. The Oklahoma Supreme Court then reviewed the evidence presented 
at trial bearing on the capability of the subject wells. Hall primarily 
                                                                                                                 
 54. 1992 OK 117, ¶¶ 17–18, 847 P.2d 333, 338. 
 55. Hall, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 10. 
 56. Id. ¶ 23. 
 57. Id. ¶ 24 (citing Hydrocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 
S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App. 1993)). The Texas Supreme Court is cited as having later approved 
that definition of “capability” in its decision in Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 
S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2002). 
 58. Hall, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21. 
 59. Id. ¶ 26. 
 60. Id. 
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challenged the trial court’s factual finding of capability on the basis that the 
wells were in disrepair after being shut-in for over four years. The court 
found that its analysis in the preceding discussion (paragraph 1, above) 
disposed of this argument. Evidence of the wells’ current or post-shut-in 
condition is not relevant to whether the wells were capable of producing in 
paying quantities on the date the wells were shut-in.61 
3. This court’s affirmation of the trial court’s finding of “capability” 
prevents Hall from contending that “production” ceased. As previously 
stated, the court defined the term “production” as meaning “capable of 
producing in paying quantities.” If the wells are capable of paying 
production, then they must be considered producing wells, and the 
habendum clauses permitting the leases to continue “for so long . . . as oil 
or gas continues to be produced” have not been breached.  Consequently, 
the trial court did not err in finding the leases were still viable.62 
4. Hall further contended that the cessation of production clauses of the 
oil and gas leases resulted in the termination of the leases. However, citing 
Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,63 the court found that a well’s capability to 
produce in paying quantities will satisfy both the habendum clause and the 
cessation of production clause of the lease, and the cessation of production 
clause is only triggered where a well has become incapable of paying 
production.64 
5. Hall next argued that the above outcomes would allow a lessee to “sit” 
on a well capable of production in paying quantities, without any actual 
production, for an indefinite time period, thereby rendering the cessation of 
production time limits of no effect.  However, the court responded by 
observing that the lessor could make a written demand for compliance with 
the implied covenant to market, which would force the lessee to commence 
actual production of the gas out of the ground and market the production or 
else face the possibility of lease cancellation.65 
6. The court found that the trial court addressed Hall’s claims for breach 
of the express lease terms by finding that the wells were capable of “paying 
production,” and then proceeded to assess whether the leases could be 
cancelled for breach of any other express or implied provisions or 
covenants. The trial court correctly found that the leases could not be 
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canceled due to a failure to satisfy the prerequisite for a demand to market 
made by the lessors.66 
7. Hall additionally argued that Oklahoma’s statutory Pugh clause67 
required the trial court to invalidate Galmor’s interest in the Pugh Clause 
Lands—i.e., those portions of the leased lands falling outside the two 160-
acre spacing units.68 Hall argued that Section 87.1(b) “would permit 
Galmor to retain the Pugh Clause Lands only if a producing well had been 
drilled on those lands within a 90-day grace period following expiration of 
the lease’s primary term, which did not happen.”69 After a detailed review 
and discussion of this so-called statutory Pugh clause, the court concluded 
that the effect of OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(b) is as follows: In cases of 
spacing units of 160 acres or more, a producer will have 90 days after the 
expiration of the primary term of the lease to develop the lands outside the 
spacing unit. If the producer does not do so, the lease will expire as to those 
lands.70 The court further stated “[s]ection 87.1(b) was meant to prevent a 
unit well’s production from satisfying the habendum clause of any lease for 
more than ninety days beyond the expiration of the primary term as to 
acreage outside of the unit when the leased premises, or any portion thereof, 
is included in a unit of 160 acres or more.”71 Consequently, the court 
concluded that Galmor’s leasehold interests in the Pugh Clause Lands 
should be forfeited, “unless he can demonstrate that Section 87.1(b) is 
somehow unconstitutional.”72 The court then found the statute to be 
constitutional.73 
8. Finally, Hall argued that the trial court erred in quieting title in favor 
of Galmor in lands covered by Non-Unit oil and gas leases (i.e., leases 
covering lands on which no well had ever been drilled by Galmor or his 
predecessors). Since no wells were ever drilled on those lands and there 
was no evidence showing that such lands had been included in a spacing 
unit or pooling agreement, the habendum clauses of the Non-Unit leases 
were not satisfied. Galmor’s leasehold rights in those lands terminated upon 
the expiration of the primary terms of the Non-Unit leases. The trial court 
erred in quieting title to that portion of the lands in Galmor. Title should 
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instead be quieted in favor of Hall due to his Top Leases covering those 
lands. To the extent the court reversed the trial court’s judgment against 
Hall on his quiet title claims concerning the Pugh Clause Lands and lands 
covered by Non-Unit leases, the court likewise vacated the portion of the 
judgment denying his cause of action for slander of title as to those lands.74 
The court remanded the case, based on the above rulings, with 
instructions to conduct further proceedings in a manner consistent with the 
court’s opinion.75 
IV. Oil and Gas Contracts, Transactions and Title Matters 
A. Court addresses dispute over whether a binding contract to sell oil and 
gas properties was formed as a result of e-mail negotiations and 
communications. 
The court’s ruling in Le Norman Operating LLC v. Chalker Energy 
Partners III, LLC,76 is likely to be criticized by those who favor certainty in 
contracting.  The Le Norman case addresses several issues that can easily 
arise, and lead to litigation, in energy and resources transactions. It 
illustrates the complications and resulting litigation risks associated with (a) 
negotiating the more-detailed terms of a transaction by e-mail, (b) engaging 
in communications and negotiations governed by the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act, infra, and (c) attempting to contract with (or as a part of) 
a group of counter-parties aligned in the transaction but with each having its 
own individual decision whether to accept or reject the final proposals. 
The Chalker Energy parties (Sellers) desired to sell their interests in 
certain oil and gas properties located in the Texas panhandle.  They 
engaged the Raymond James firm to conduct the sale process.  The group 
of Sellers also designated Chalker Energy Partners (Chalker Energy) to 
function as their designated agent in conducting the sale.77 Remora, one of 
the Sellers, monitored the sales efforts and reported back to the other 
Sellers.  “The Sellers entered into the ‘Chalker Engagement Agreement,’ 
which set out the process by which potential sales of [the assets] would be 
considered.”78  
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 76. 547 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App. – Hou. 2017). 
 77. Id. at 31. 
 78. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
16 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
In August 2012, Raymond James sent an e-mail to potential buyers 
announcing the sale of the assets and advising as to the person to whom 
interested parties should direct their inquiries.  Le Norman was one of the 
parties who received that e-mail and decided to engage in the bidding 
process.79  On September 30, 2012, Le Norman and Chalker signed a 
confidentiality agreement so that Le Norman could view the information in 
the virtual data room concerning the assets and participate in the bid 
process.  A form Purchase and Sale Agreement was available in the data 
room for potential buyers to review.80 In addition to confidentiality 
provisions, the confidentiality agreement provided in relevant part, in 
section 18: 
No Obligation. The Parties hereto understand that unless and 
until a definitive agreement has been executed and delivered, no 
contract or agreement providing for a transaction between the 
Parties shall be deemed to exist and neither Party will be under 
any legal obligation of any kind whatsoever with respect to such 
transaction by virtue of this or any written or oral expression 
thereof, except, in the case of this Agreement, for the matters 
specially agreed to herein.  For purposes of this Agreement, the 
term “definitive agreement” does not include an executed letter 
of intent or any other preliminary written agreement or offer, 
unless specifically so designated in writing and executed by both 
Parties.81 
The confidentiality agreement further stated that Chalker Energy 
reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to: ... (c) discontinue 
consideration of a transaction at any time; (d) reject any and all 
proposals made by any party with regard to a transaction; (e) 
terminate discussions and negotiations with [Le Norman] or any 
party at any time for any reason; and (f) conduct the process 
relating to a possible transaction in any manner it deems 
appropriate or change the procedure for conducting that 
process.82 
Raymond James made a presentation to potential bidders, which Le 
Norman attended, advising as to the bid procedure and the use of the virtual 
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data room containing detailed information regarding the assets and other 
materials.  The potential bidders were instructed to include with their bids a 
marked copy of the proposed form of purchase and sale agreement provided 
in the data room, indicating additions or deletions required by the bidder in 
order to sign the document as a definitive purchase and sale agreement.83  
The bidders were advised that, once Chalker Energy received bids, each 
member of the Sellers group “shall be given 24 hours to elect to sell their 
interest once the purchase price has been determined.”84  The presentation 
further advised potential bidders that, “[u]pon the negotiation of the PSA, 
each [Seller] shall be given 48 hours to elect to accept the terms of the PSA 
and execute the appropriate documents.”85  
The data room presentation provided a further disclaimer to Le Norman 
and the other potential bidders, stating: 
[Chalker Energy] reserves the right to negotiate with one or 
more prospective parties at any time and to enter into a definitive 
agreement for a transaction without prior notice to you or to 
other prospective parties. [Chalker Energy] also reserves the 
right to terminate, at any time, further participation in the due 
diligence and proposal process by any party and to modify any 
procedures without providing any reason therefore.  [Chalker 
Energy] intends to conduct its business in the ordinary manner 
during the evaluation and offer period; however, [it] reserves the 
right to take any action, whether in or out of the ordinary course 
of business, which in its sole discretion it deems necessary or 
prudent in the conduct of such business.86 
On November 5, 2012, Le Norman submitted a bid via e-mail offering 
$322 million for 100% of the assets (i.e., requiring that all members of the 
Seller group agree to sell under the proposed terms).  Le Norman’s bid 
stated that it was subject to the execution by the parties of a mutually 
acceptable Purchase and Sale Agreement.  Le Norman also included with 
its bid a redlined copy of the proposed form of purchase and sale agreement 
showing the changes required by Le Norman. Chalker Energy and Remora 
both indicated that the changes of Le Norman were insignificant.87 
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 “Upon receipt of the first round of bids, Raymond James asked the two 
highest bidders, [Le Norman] and Jones Energy, to increase their bids.”88  
Le Norman revised its bid to $345 million for 100% of the assets, and Le 
Norman again included a proposed purchase and sale agreement based on 
the form provided by the Sellers in the virtual data room. Chalker Energy 
selected Le Norman’s bid to present to the other Sellers and gave them 24 
hours to respond.  When the elections of the other Sellers resulted in only 
82% of the assets being committed to Le Norman’s offer, the parties 
continued their negotiations and made several offers and counter-offers.  
Those negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful.  On November 14, 2012, 
Le Norman informed Chalker Energy by e-mail that it would no longer 
pursue the transaction, however it left open the possibility that some 
agreement might be reached in the future.89 
On November 19, 2012, in response to a new offer from the Sellers for a 
smaller percentage of the assets, Le Norman sent an e-mail to Raymond 
James proposing new terms.  The e-mail subject line stated, “RE: Counter 
Proposal.”90  Among a total of seven deal points, Le Norman offered $230 
million for 67% of the assets and provided that it was subject to a “PSA 
similar to what we returned with the above caveats,”91 and also required the 
execution by the parties of a joint operating agreement (to be attached to the 
purchase and sale agreement) and a non-compete agreement.  Unlike Le 
Norman’s prior bids, this counter proposal did not make any reference to 
the bid procedure and it advised Raymond James that Le Norman would not 
accept any changes to the proposal and would not extend the deadlines 
stated in its proposal.92 
On November 20, 2012, Raymond James replied to Le Norman’s counter 
proposal, stating: “We have the group on board to deliver 67% subject to a 
mutually agreeable PSA.  We are calling to discuss next steps and timing. 
Chalker et al. will be turning a PSA tonight to respond to your last draft. 
Please give me a call to discuss scheduling and timing.”93  On the same 
date, Chalker Energy sent an e-mail to the other members of the Seller 
group advising of the e-mail sent earlier in the day to Le Norman, 
discussing the uncertain timing, and asking that the Sellers “monitor your e-
mail for updates and/or any requests that may be necessary to complete the 
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preparation of agreements for the sale.”94  The parties continued to work 
toward finalizing the purchase and sale agreement.  The parties needed to 
complete key exhibits to that agreement, as well as an escrow agreement, 
non-compete agreement and a joint operating agreement.  “E-mails 
continued to pass between the parties including an e-mail from Chalker 
Energy to [Le Norman] discussing the Assets and referring to them as ‘what 
is being sold to Le Norman.’”95  At the end of the day on November 21st 
(the day before Thanksgiving Day), Chalker Energy e-mailed Le Norman 
an updated draft of the purchase and sale agreement and state that it would 
not expected to hear from Le Norman until Monday, November 26th.96 
Also on November 21st, a representative from Jones Energy sent a new 
offer to Chalker Energy that Chalker viewed as providing benefits that the 
Le Norman deal did not offer.  On November 23rd, Chalker submitted 
ballots to the Sellers to determine if they were willing to negotiate a sale of 
the assets to Jones Energy, and the Sellers responded in the affirmative.  
Chalker and Jones Energy negotiated final terms for the purchase and sale 
agreement.97 
On November 28, 2012, the Sellers and Jones Energy finalized and 
signed their purchase and sale agreement.  On the same day, Le Norman 
delivered a purchase and sale agreement to Chalker Energy.  Upon learning 
of the deal reached between the Sellers and Jones Energy, Le Norman sent 
several letters demanding that the Sellers “honor the contract they had 
entered into on November 19-20.”98  The purchase and sale transaction with 
Jones Energy proceeded forward and the sale of assets closed on December 
12, 2012.  However, when Jones Energy learned of the claims and demands 
of Le Norman, it refused to release the escrowed funds and asserted that the 
Sellers’ failure to disclose Le Norman’s demands was a breach of the Jones 
Energy purchase and sale agreement.99 
Le Norman sued the Sellers asserting that they breached their agreement 
to sell a 67% interest in the assets for $230 million.100  Le Norman also 
sued Jones Energy for tortious interference with Le Norman’s alleged 
contract, but that suit was later settled.  The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Sellers finding, among other things, that the Sellers 
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had not reached a binding contract to sell any part of the assets to Le 
Norman.  However, the trial court specifically denied Sellers’ motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds of (a) the statute of frauds, with the 
Sellers contending that there was a failure to include sufficient property 
descriptions, and (b) Sellers’ assertion that there was no acceptance of the 
alleged offer.  The parties appealed.101 
In addressing Le Norman’s assertion on appeal that a contract had been 
reached with the Sellers, certain of the key holdings of the Texas Court of 
Appeals were as follows: 
First, the court described some of the pertinent rules of Texas contract 
law relating to the formation of contracts: 
An enforceable and legally binding contract exists if it is 
sufficiently definite, certain, and clear in its essential terms.  A 
binding agreement may exist when parties agree on some terms 
sufficient to create a contract, leaving other provisions for later 
negotiation.  When an agreement leaves essential (or material) 
matters open for future negotiation and those negotiations are 
unsuccessful, however, the agreement ‘is not binding upon the 
parties and merely constitutes an agreement to agree.  The 
question of what terms are essential to a contract is determined 
on a contract-by-contract basis, depending on the subject matter 
of the contract at issue.  The parties must have a meeting of the 
minds and must communicate consent to the essential terms of 
the alleged agreement, which is determined based on an 
objective standard of what the parties said and did rather than on 
their subjective states of mind.102 [citations omitted] 
Second, the court found that the confidentiality agreement provided that 
a letter of intent or preliminary agreement was not a definitive agreement.  
However, the confidentiality agreement did not describe what constituted a 
definitive agreement.  After reviewing the facts in this case in detail, 
including examples of specific members of the Seller group who stated that 
they intended to enter a binding agreement with Le Norman before a 
definitive agreement was reached, the court concluded that a fact issue 
existed as to whether the November 19-20 e-mail chain and subsequent 
written elections were sufficient to constitute a definitive agreement for the 
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sale of the assets.103  Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Sellers.104 
Third, the court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the Sellers based on the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 
(UETA) and the trial court’s finding that the parties did not agree to 
conduct business electronically, and because the e-mail lacks an electronic 
signature.105  The court first reviewed the pertinent elements of the UETA: 
Under the UETA, a legal requirement of a writing can be 
satisfied with an electronic record, and a legal requirement of a 
signature can be satisfied by an electronic signature.  TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE ANN. § 322.007(c), (d) (West 2015).  The UETA 
applies “only to transactions between parties each of which has 
agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means.” Id. § 
322.005(b) (West 2015).  Contrary to the Sellers’ argument, the 
UETA does not require an explicit agreement to conduct 
transactions by electronic means, but instead provides, “Whether 
the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is 
determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, 
including the parties’ conduct.” Id.106 
The court reviewed the facts and circumstances presented in this lawsuit 
and concluded that “the conduct of the parties here in engaging in 
negotiations and other relevant business via electronic means constitutes at 
least some evidence that the parties agreed to conduct some of their 
transactions electronically.”107  The trial court’s summary judgment ruling 
against Le Norman on this issue was reversed.108 
After addressing other issues in the appeal, the court of appeals affirmed 
in part and reversed in part the judgment below and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.109 
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V. Marketing and Refining of Oil and Gas Production 
A. Widely followed rulings of the Bankruptcy Court in In re Sabine Oil & 
Gas Corp., allowing the debtor to reject midstream services contracts, are 
affirmed by the district court and Second Circuit. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
was presented in 2017, in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.,110 with the appeal 
of three highly-publicized rulings of the bankruptcy court in the Chapter 11 
proceedings of Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. Those rulings determined that 
“appellants’ agreements with Sabine to provide gathering services did not 
run with the land under Texas property law.”111 The court therefore granted 
Sabine’s motion to reject the agreements as executory pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 
365(a). In reviewing the bankruptcy court’s rulings, the district court 
recognized at the outset: 
[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that “runs 
with the land,” since such a covenant creates a property interest 
that is not extinguished through bankruptcy. The parties here 
agree on the foregoing, and therefore their dispute comes down 
to whether the Agreements run with the land and therefore 
cannot be rejected pursuant to § 365(a).112 
After a detailed review of pertinent case law and the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, the court rejected the appellants’ assertion that the 
gathering services agreements dedicated the oil and gas leases of Sabine to 
the contracts in a way that conveyed a property interest in the lands. Rather, 
the court concluded that the agreements granted to appellants “merely [the] 
contractual right to be the exclusive providers of certain services for gas 
and condensate produced in certain areas.”113 Since the agreements did not 
touch and concern the land, the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that 
the agreements did not run with the land as real covenants. 
The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that agreements 
constituted equitable servitudes under Texas law. The district court found 
that the appellants’ agreements did not satisfy the requirements for being 
equitable servitudes since, among other reasons, the agreements did not 
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“limit Sabine’s use of its property interests in the Dedicated Areas. 
Moreover, the Agreements benefit only appellants, not their land.”114 
The district court affirmed the orders of the bankruptcy court.  The gas 
processing companies (Nordheim) appealed. 
In a decision issued in May 2018,115 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit addressed the appeal of the judgment of the Southern 
District of New York. The parties to the appeal agreed that for a real 
covenant to run with the land under Texas law, it must (in addition to three 
other requirements that were not in dispute) touch and concern the land, and 
whether the legal test includes a requirement of horizontal privity. 
The Second Circuit found that it did not need to determine whether the 
agreement “touches and concerns” the land, because it found that Texas law 
still required horizontal privity and that test was not met in this case. In 
order for the parties to the original agreement to have been in horizontal 
privity with one another, there must have been some common interest in the 
land other than the purported covenant itself at the time it was executed.116 
The court agreed with the bankruptcy court that horizontal privity remained 
a requirement of Texas real covenants. 
The court then rejected Nordheim’s contention that horizontal privity of 
estate is established through the separate agreements conveying the pipeline 
easement and a separate parcel of land. The bankruptcy court below 
determined that this separate conveyance was insufficient to establish 
horizontal privity of estate. The Second Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy 
court.117   
The order of the district court was affirmed. 
B. Court finds that the transportation of liquid propane is not an 
ultrahazardous activity for purposes of strict liability. 
The case of Elmore v. Dixie Pipeline Company,118 involved an appeal of 
the trial court’s summary judgment rulings in favor of Dixie, as well as an 
appeal of the court’s ruling that the testimony of plaintiff’s expert was 
inadmissible as to the standard of care for pipeline operators and related 
issues. Dixie operates a pipeline extending approximately 1,100 miles from 
Texas to North Carolina. Liquid propane is transported through the 
pipeline. On November 1, 2007, the pipeline ruptured at a location 
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approximately 1.1 miles from Elmore’s home. Elmore sued Dixie, as 
operator of the pipeline, asserting that “her house suffered structural 
damage as a result of the shockwaves from the explosion.”119 Elmore 
asserted claims of negligence, strict liability and punitive damages. 
Prior to trial, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Dixie as to Elmore’s claims for strict liability, punitive damages and 
negligence. The court also excluded the testimony of Elmore’s expert 
witness Dr. Clarke, a metallurgical engineer. Elmore appealed. 
As a foundational matter, the court recognized that the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the pipeline rupture at 
issue in this case and reached certain conclusions. “Importantly, the NTSB 
concluded that the following were not factors in the rupture: corrosion, 
excavation damage, the controller’s actions, or the operating conditions of 
the pipeline.”120 The NTSB ultimately concluded that “the probable cause” 
of the subject pipeline rupture “was the failure of a weld that caused the 
pipe to fracture along the longitudinal seam weld, a portion of the upstream 
girth weld, and portions of the adjacent pipe joints.”121  
The court of appeals addressed the exclusion of Dr. Clarke’s proposed 
testimony regarding the standard of care of pipeline operators and the 
alleged breach of that standard by Dixie.  The court evaluated the proposed 
expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence122 
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.123  After reviewing in 
detail the materials relied upon by Dr. Clarke, certain materials he did not 
review and rely on, the information and opinions that would be relevant to 
the plaintiff’s claims and conflicts between the NTSB’s report and the 
opinions of Dr. Clarke, the court affirmed the circuit court’s exclusion of 
his testimony. The court found in part: “Since Dr. Clarke lacked familiarity 
with or understanding of the federal regulations and standards, the circuit 
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court properly excluded his ability to opine as to the standard of care for 
pipeline operators or any violation of that standard of care by Dixie.”124 
Turning to the circuit court’s dismissal of Elmore’s strict liability claims, 
the court considered the six factors set forth in the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS Section 520: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, 
land[,] or chattels of others, (b) likelihood that the harm that 
results from it will be great, (c) inability to eliminate the risk by 
the exercise of reasonable care, (d) extent to which the activity is 
not a matter of common usage, (e) inappropriateness of the 
activity to the place it was carried on, and (f) extent to which its 
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes.125 
The court noted that the transportation of liquid propane is a regulated 
commercial activity, subject to state and federal regulations. Moreover, it 
found that “the transportation of liquid propane is of great value to 
commerce and local, regional, and nationwide communities.”126  The court 
concluded that, overall, the transportation of liquid propane does not 
constitute an ultrahazardous activity. 
With respect to the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence 
claim, in light of the exclusion of her expert’s testimony, Elmore asserted 
on appeal that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have been applied. 
However, the court of appeals concluded that this doctrine was not 
available to the plaintiff because the second element of the doctrine (i.e., 
“the injury must be such that in the ordinary course of things it would not 
occur if those in control of the instrumentality used proper care”127) was not 
demonstrated by the plaintiff. Rather, the court reviewed particular aspects 
of the evidence presented to the circuit court and found that “there is simply 
no evidence that in the ordinary course of things, the pipeline would not 
have ruptured had Dixie used proper care.”128 
Finally, the court concluded that its affirmance of the dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s claims of strict liability and negligence rendered moot any 
consideration of the circuit court’s dismissal of the claim for punitive 
damages. 
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VI. Surface Use, Surface Damages, Oklahoma Surface Damages Act, 
Condemnation and Environmental Cases 
A. Court of Appeals upholds the “larger parcel” valuation method in 
determining the value of the property taken. 
The case of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. H&L Double MC, 
LLP,129 involved a condemnation action filed by the Oklahoma Department 
of Transportation (“ODOT”). The landowner filed this appeal from the trial 
court’s journal entry on the jury verdict. The commissioners appointed by 
the trial court to appraise the 3.36 acres of land at issue determined that 
H&L was entitled to receive just compensation in the amount of 
$103,850.00. H&L and the ODOT both filed demands for a jury trial, 
although H&L later withdrew its demand. 
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury returned a verdict determining 
the value of the taking to be $30,400.00. However, the verdict included a 
note indicating a value of twenty-two cents a square foot. Because the 
verdict could not be reconciled, the trial court granted H&L’s motion for 
new trial. The case proceeded to a new, second trial. The jury returned a 
verdict of $33,000.00. H&L appeals. 
On appeal, H&L asserted that the trial court erred in the admission of 
ODOT’s expert appraiser’s appraisal and his testimony regarding the same. 
H&L alleged that Grace’s appraisal was based on a “larger parcel” 
valuation method that was held unconstitutional in State ex rel. Department 
of Transportation v. Caliber Development Co.130 However, the court of 
appeals found that, contrary to H&L’s assertion, Caliber did not hold that 
the larger parcel method of valuation was unconstitutional. In Caliber, with 
respect to the larger parcel method, the court of appeals found the expert 
was permitted to extensively testify about the valuation method. Contrary to 
H&L’s assertions on appeal, the court of appeals did not address or hold 
that the method was constitutionally invalid. 
In this case, Grace specifically testified that he used the larger parcel 
valuation method in determining a value for the property. H&L has not 
provided the court with any authority that this is a constitutionally invalid 
method of valuation. This assertion of error is denied. 
H&L further asserts that Grace’s appraisal “was based on the 
unconstitutional ‘before-and-after’ valuation method,”131 citing Caliber at ¶ 
                                                                                                                 
 129. 2018 OK CIV APP 54, 423 P.3d 702. 
 130. 2002 OK 60, ¶ 36, 52 P.3d 1014, 1033.   
 131. H&L Double MC, LLP, 2018 OK CIV APP 54, at ¶ 13. 
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10. The court of appeals disagreed and found that Grace’s appraisal was 
based on the larger parcel method. So, this assertion of error was denied. 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment from the 
conclusion of the second trial. 
See also, State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Pennington,132 in which 
the court of appeals affirmed the judgment below, rejecting multiple 
assertions by the landowner that the trial court erred in connection with the 
condemnation proceedings below. 
B. Court holds that wind energy developer’s excavation work in 
construction of wind turbines constituted “mining” under federal 
regulations applicable to the Indian lands.  
The case of United States v. Osage Wind, LLC,133 involved a 2010 lease 
by Osage Wind of solely surface rights to approximately 8,400 acres of 
private fee land in Osage County, Oklahoma. Osage Wind leased the land 
for the purpose of building a commercial wind farm—a facility that collects 
and stores wind-generated electricity. The court described the proposed 
project as follows: 
The planned wind-farm involved the installation of eighty-four 
wind turbines secured in the ground by reinforced concrete 
foundations, underground electrical lines running between the 
turbines and a substation, overhead transmission line, 
meteorological towers, and access roads. These structures would 
occupy around 1.5 percent of the total acreage of leased surface 
land. In September 2011, OMC [Osage Mineral Council] and the 
United States expressed concern that the planned project would 
interfere with oil and gas production by blocking access to the 
mineral estate.134 
In light of the foregoing concern, the OMC filed suit in October 2011 to 
prevent Osage Wind from constructing the proposed wind farm.135 In that 
lawsuit, OMC alleged “that the planned wind farm would unlawfully 
deprive OMC’s oil-and-gas lessees of reasonable use of the surface 
estate.”136 The court ruled against OMC in that case because there was no 
                                                                                                                 
 132. 417 P.3d 1274, 2018 OK CIV APP 39. 
 133. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 134. Id. at 1083. 
 135. See Osage Nation ex rel. Osage Minerals Council v. Wind Capital Grp., LLC, No. 
11–CV–643–GKF–PJC, 2011 WL 6371384 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2011). 
 136. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d at 1083 (10th Cir. 2017).  
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evidence that the oil and gas lessees were planning to use the surface estate 
in a manner that would conflict with Osage Wind’s proposed use of the 
land. 
In October 2013, Osage Wind began site preparation and road 
construction for the wind farm. Excavation work for the wind turbines had 
begun by September 2014.  
Each turbine required the support of a cement foundation 
measuring 10 feet deep and up to 60 feet in diameter. . . This 
process involved the extraction of soil, sand, and rock of varying 
sizes—all of which was of a common mineral variety, including 
limestone and dolomite. Rock pieces smaller than 3 feet were 
crushed into even smaller sizes.137 
In November 2014, the United States, as trustee for the mineral estate on 
behalf of the Osage tribe, sued Oklahoma Wind to halt the excavation work. 
In that lawsuit, the U.S. ultimately sought damages based on the alleged 
unauthorized extraction of reserved minerals. In particular, the U.S. 
asserted that the sand, soil and rock extraction activities of Osage Wind 
“was ‘mining’ under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 and thus required a mineral lease 
under 25 C.F.R. § 214.7.”138 The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Osage Wind and ruled that the excavation work did not 
constitute mining under Section 211.3, with the result that the leasing 
requirement was not triggered under Section 214.7.  
On the final day of the appeal deadline, the United States advised OMC 
that it did not intend to appeal the district court’s ruling. Although the OMC 
was not a party to the proceedings before the district court, the Tenth 
Circuit allowed OMC to appeal the summary judgment. It found that OMC 
had a “unique interest in this case entitling it to appeal without having 
intervened below.”139  
The Tenth Circuit began its review of the liability issues in the case by 
describing its assessment of what it perceived to be key underlying facts: 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 1086. The court emphasized that “[a] generalized interest in vindicating a legal 
right is not enough to trigger our unique-interest exception. An interested person must have a 
particularized and significant stake in the appeal, and must further demonstrate cause for 
why he did not or could not intervene in the proceedings below. OMC’s interest here is 
particularized and significant because the Osage Nation owns the beneficial interest in the 
mineral estate at use.” 
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Osage Wind engaged in large-scale mineral excavation work to 
install wind turbines. It first removed rock sediment and soil 
from the ground, creating large holes into which it could pour a 
cement foundation for each turbine. Next, it sorted the extracted 
rock material into small and large pieces, and then crushed the 
smaller pieces so they would be the proper size for backfilling 
the holes. Finally, it positioned the bigger rock pieces adjacent to 
the backfilled excavation sites. All of this was done to add 
structural support to the large wind turbines installed deep in the 
ground. The question here is whether this excavation work—
digging, sorting, crushing, and backfilling—constitutes “mining” 
under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3.140 
The district court below “held that the definition of mining necessarily 
involves the commercialization of mineral materials, i.e. the sale of 
minerals.”141 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and found that the text of Section 
211.3 “does not indicate that mining is confined to commercializing 
extracted minerals or relocating them offsite—instead it refers merely to the 
‘science, technique, and business of mineral of mineral development.’”142 
The court also rejected Osage Wind’s contention that other regulations 
suggest that Section 211.3 contemplates that “mining” involves the sale of 
minerals. 
The Tenth Circuit additionally recognized “the long-established principle 
that ambiguity in laws designed to favor the Indians ought ‘to be liberally 
construed’ in the Indians’ favor.”143 
Importantly, the court agreed that “merely encountering or incidentally 
disrupting mineral materials would not trigger § 211.3’s definition,” and 
that “the simple removal of dirt does not constitute mining.”144 However, 
the court noted that Osage Wind did not merely dig holes in the ground but 
went further: 
After Osage Wind removed the rock materials from each hole, it 
acted upon the minerals by altering their natural size and shape 
in order to take advantage of them for a structural purpose. 
Osage Wind needed to stabilize these tall wind turbines, and 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 1087. 
 141. Id. at 1089. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 1090 (citations omitted). 
 144. Id. at 1091 (internal citation omitted). 
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“develop[ed]” the removed rock in such a way that would 
accomplish that goal.145 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that “there is ambiguity in the scope of 
‘mineral development’ and the extent to which that phrase includes the 
sorting and crushing of minerals for the purpose of backfilling and 
stabilization.”146 Citing again the rule that ambiguous laws designed to 
favor the Indians are to be liberally construed in the Indians’ favor, the 
court held that Osage Wind’s excavation work constituted mining under 
Section 211.3 and that the company was required to secure a federally-
approved lease from OMC under Section 214.7. The summary judgment 
ruling in favor of Osage Wind was reversed and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings. 
C. Court finds that plaintiff-town’s claims for trespass and nuisance with 
respect to natural-gas compressor stations and metering station were 
barred by limitations.  
In Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corporation,147 the town filed suit on 
February 8, 2011, against the defendant-owners of four natural gas 
compressor stations and a metering station located just outside the town. 
The town asserted claims for injuries based upon trespass and nuisance.  
The evidence in the case showed that the residents of the town began 
complaining about the noise and odor emanating from those facilities as 
early as 2006, although arguments were made as to whether the operative 
facts that would begin the running of the limitations period occurred as 
early as 2006. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
based on the two-year statute of limitations.  The Texas Supreme Court 
affirmed, finding that the defendant energy companies had “proven that any 
legal injury the residents suffered commenced, at the latest, in May 
2008.”148 As a result, the two-year statute of limitations barred the town’s 
claims. 
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 148. Id. at 614. 
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D. Court finds that county ordinance prohibiting storage and permanent 
disposal of wastewater was preempted by state law. 
Under the facts presented in EQT Production Company v. Wender,149 
EQT operated one underground injection control well (UIC) located in 
Fayette County, West Virginia.  The well was used to dispose of 
wastewater generated by hundreds of conventional vertical producing oil 
and gas wells operated by EQT both within and outside the county.150  EQT 
injected the wastewater underground into a confined, underground 
formation for permanent disposal.151 EQT’s operation of the UIC well was 
subject to state regulations and was authorized by a state-issued permit.  
Further, in the interest of protecting underground sources of drinking water, 
EQT’s disposal operations were also subject to federal regulation 
(administered by the state) under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
300f et seq. which imposes certain regulations on injection wells. 
Notwithstanding the state and federal regulations, Fayette County 
enacted, on January 12, 2016, a blanket ban on all permanent disposal of 
wastewater within the county.152  The Ordinance also banned the storage of 
wastewater at conventional well sites.153  The Ordinance stated that the ban 
would “specifically apply to injection wells for the purpose of permanently 
disposing of natural gas waste and oil waste.”154  On January 13, 2016, 
immediately after the ordinance was enacted, EQT filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia to enjoin 
key aspects of the Ordinance as being preempted by state and federal law.  
The district court entered a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction in favor of EQT.155  Both parties moved for summary judgment.  
EQT argued that the Ordinance’s ban on operation of its state-licensed 
injection well was preempted by West Virginia’s UIC permit program.  
Because West Virginia’s UIC permit program was not only enacted 
pursuant to state law and also mandated by the federal Safe Drinking Water 
Act, EQT argued that the Ordinance’s ban on injection wells was 
preempted by federal law.  The district court granted summary judgment to 
                                                                                                                 
 149. 870 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 150. Id. at 327. 
 151. Id. 
 152. The ordinance was entitled “Ordinance Banning the Storage, Disposal, or Use of Oil 
and Natural Gas Waste in Fayette County, West Virginia.” Id. at 327-328. 
 153. Id. at 336. 
 154. Id. at 328. 
 155. Id.  
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EQT and permanently enjoined the challenged provisions of the 
Ordinance.156 The defendants appealed. 
In reviewing the preemption issues presented in this appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit described one of the first questions to be addressed as being the 
following: 
Under West Virginia law, may the County prohibit EQT from 
engaging in precisely the activity—permanent disposal of 
wastewater at the UIC well—that has been sanctioned by a state 
permit, effectively nullifying the license issued by West 
Virginia’s DEP pursuant to state statutory authority? . . .We need 
only determine whether a West Virginia county is authorized to 
take aim at the permitted activity itself, enacting a blanket 
prohibition on conduct specifically licensed by the state.157 
The court observed that counties of the State have only the limited powers 
granted to them by the West Virginia Constitution and the Legislature.  The 
court noted that it would make no sense to assume that the State would 
delegate to a county, a creature of the State, the power to undo the State’s 
permitting scheme.158  Finding that all local law in the State is subject to the 
implied condition that the law may not be inconsistent with state law and 
must yield to the predominant power of the state, the court held that the 
Ordinance’s ban on the operation of EQT’s UIC well was preempted by 
state law. 
The County argued that the savings clause of the West Virginia Water 
Pollution Control Act,159 which governs the state’s permitting of UIC wells, 
recognized that the County had the authority to enact ordinances for the 
elimination of hazards to the public health and to abate anything the 
commission determined to be a public nuisance.  The court found that the 
County’s argument proposed an unreasonably broad interpretation of the 
Water Pollution Control Act’s savings clause.  The court concluded that a 
more logical reading would be to view the clause as providing clarification 
that the possession of a state permit would not preclude all local regulation 
touching on the licensed activity.  For example, the County might bring a 
                                                                                                                 
 156. EQT Prod. Co. v. Wender, 191 F.Supp.3d 583, 603 (S.D.W. Va. 2016). 
 157. Wender, 870 F.3d at 332. 
 158. Id. at 333. 
 159. See W. VA. CODE § 22-11-27, which provide in part: “[N]othing herein contained 
shall abridge or alter rights of action or remedies ..., nor shall any provisions ... be construed 
as estopping the state, municipalities, public health officers, or persons ... in the exercise of 
their rights to suppress nuisances or to abate any pollution....” 
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common law action for public nuisance with respect to state-permitted UIC 
wells.  The Fourth Circuit noted that “[a] county has the ‘power to abate 
nuisances, not to determine what shall be considered nuisances.’”160  The 
court concluded that the Ordinance’s prohibition on all disposal of 
wastewater in UIC wells was preempted by state law. 
The court then reviewed the Ordinance’s restriction on the storage of 
wastewater at conventional well sites.  Having already found that the 
Ordinance’s core prohibition on permanent wastewater disposal was 
preempted, the court noted that there was little left to discuss concerning 
the ancillary storage restriction.  Considered separately, the Ordinance’s 
restriction on storage was found to be inconsistent with the state Oil and 
Gas Act and was preempted.  The Oil and Gas Act vests the state 
Department of Environmental Protection with “exclusive authority over 
regulation of the state’s oil and gas resources, including ‘all matters’ related 
to the ‘development, production, storage and recovery of this state’s oil and 
gas.’”161  The court found that the DEP’s authority extended to the 
regulation of the storage of wastewater at conventional production well 
sites. 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in all 
respects. 
E. Court resolves venue issues of lawsuit relating to injection wells 
permitted by the Texas Railroad Commission. 
The case of Ring Energy v. Trey Resources, Inc.,162 presented the first 
impression question of “whether a trial court outside of Travis County has 
the jurisdiction to enjoin a party with a valid permit from developing and 
using an injection well based on the claims that the injection well will cause 
imminent and irreparable injury to the complaining party.”163 
Trey applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for nine permits to inject 
fluids into designated wells located in Andrews County, Texas. On January 
17, 2013, the Commission granted the applications without any formal 
hearing.164 On September 23, 2013, and before any injection operations 
began, Ring sued Trey in Andrews County. Ring first alleged that the 
Commission permits were void ab initio due to an alleged failure to give 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Wender, 870 F.3d at 336. (citing Sharon Steel Co. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E. 2d 
616, 625 (W. Va. 1985)). 
 161. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 22-6-2(c)(12)). 
 162. 546 S.W.3d 199, (Tex. App. – El Paso 2017). 
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proper notice to Trey’s predecessor. Ring further alleged that fluid injection 
would cause substantial damage to Ring’s mineral interest and result in 
waste, and it sought damages and equitable relief under TEX. NAT. RES. 
CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2011).165 Finally, Ring asserted “that its 
interests were in imminent danger of irreparable harm, and sought a 
temporary restraining order, and a temporary and permanent injunction.”166 
Trey moved to dismiss Ring’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Trey argued that Ring failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies before the Commission, and that any appeal of the Commission’s 
order(s) must be filed in Travis County, the county in which the Texas state 
capitol, and the Commission, are located. Both sides agreed that damages 
would be available if the injection wells did in fact cause injury, and that 
Ring could seek pre-damage injunctive relief in Travis County. However, 
Trey maintained that any suit outside of Travis County would be a 
collateral attack on a permit issued by the Commission. The trial court 
granted the motion to dismiss. Ring appealed. 
In rejecting Trey’s arguments and reversing the trial court’s order 
dismissing Ring’s lawsuit, the Texas Court of Appeals emphasized in part 
the following findings: 
First, the general venue provisions in Texas permitted a suit to be filed 
where all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim 
occurred.167 That venue would often be a county other than Travis 
County.168 
Second, the court rejected Trey’s argument that the Texas Railroad 
Commission held exclusive jurisdiction over injection wells until all 
administrative avenues had been exhausted. Under the Texas 
Constitution,169 “[d]istrict courts are courts of general jurisdiction and 
generally have subject matter jurisdiction absent a showing to the 
contrary.”170  
Finally, with respect to Trey’s assertion that Ring’s lawsuit was a 
collateral attack on an order of the Commission, the court distinguished 
cases relied upon by Trey as involving specific findings of the Commission 
that were in conflict with the lawsuit in question. In this case, there were no 
specific findings by the Commission that might provide the court with 
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 167. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a) (West 2002). 
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confidence “that the Commission’s expertise was actually applied to the 
waste potential for the nine wells at issue.”171 
For another lawsuit raising other issues with regard to claims by one 
operator against another alleging that several injection wells were damaging 
the plaintiff’s interests, see In re Discovery Operating, Inc.172 
VII. Oklahoma Corporation Commission Matters 
A. Court resolves dispute as to Commission proceedings brought pursuant 
to the Oklahoma 2011 Shale Reservoir Development Act, now known as the 
Oklahoma Extended Horizontal Well Development Act (SRDA).    
In Continental Resources, Inc. v. Fairfield Mineral Company, LLC,173 
Continental appealed the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s order 
issued on Continental’s application to have four separately designated 
common sources of supply pooled into a single unit under the Oklahoma 
2011 Shale Reservoir Development Act, now known as the Oklahoma 
Extended Horizontal Well Development Act (SRDA).174   
Continental had already completed a multi-unit horizontal well (the 
Ritter well) in the Woodford formation. The evidence showed that the 
Ritter well also penetrated the Mississippian formation. The Hunton 
formation was shown to be beneath the Woodford. This qualified the 
Hunton and Woodford to be each considered as “associated common 
sources of supply” under the SRDA.  
The Commission entered its order, now the subject of this appeal, 
establishing the “Woodford Unit” as consisting of the Woodford common 
source of supply and its associated common sources of supply (the 
Mississippian and Hunton) “but only for the purpose of inadvertent 
penetration into those formation.”175 The Commission’s order provided that 
an owner who did not elect to participate in the already-drilled Woodford 
well would relinquishment its rights in the Woodford; however, the owner 
would only relinquish rights in the Mississippian and Hunton shale 
formations as to a well that inadvertently penetrated those two 
formations.176  
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id. at 215. 
 172. 216 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2007). 
 173. No. 116,284 (Companion with Case No. 116,285), Oklahoma Court of Appeals 
(Decision Issued June 13, 2018 - Not for Publication). 
 174.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 87.6-87.9 (2011). 
 175. Opinion in No. 116,284, at page 6. 
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The Commission interpreted the SRDA to limit use of each multi-unit 
horizontal well to the development of a targeted reservoir. As a result, 
according to the Commission, the additional Mississippian, Springer and 
Hunton shale formations could not be developed by the Ritter well. 
The order of the Commission provided for elections to participate in 
drilling, or alternatively relinquishment of rights, separately as to each unit. 
The order specifically stated that any owner subject to the order would have 
the right to a separate election as between the Woodford, Mississippian and 
Springer units. In sum, the Commission pooled the units but declined to 
“aggregate” them for development, election and relinquishment purposes.   
Continental appealed the order. It argued that it had the right to pool 
several discrete common sources of supply such that owners in all the 
pooled formations would be required to elect to participate in the cost of 
drilling and completion of the Woodford well—or their right to drill in all 
common sources of supply would be transferred by operation of law to 
Continental. Fairfield protested, complaining inter alia that Continental had 
declined to recommend separate elections for each of the formations. 
After reviewing the case and applicable legal principles, the Oklahoma 
Court of Appeals concluded that only the Woodford and its associated 
common sources of supply were “affected units” for the Ritter well. 
Consequently, this cause never reached consideration of the remaining 
formations for possible pooling with the Woodford because they are not, 
under the facts in this case, “affected units” for the Ritter well.177 The court 
found that the result was that the SRDA does not, under the facts of this 
case, provide authority for pooling the four formations.   
In conclusion, the court held that Continental sought to aggregate the 
four shale formations so as to require an election on the Ritter well or 
relinquishment of rights to drill in all four shale formations. The 
Commission denied that request and entered an order that pooled the 
targeted formation and its associated common sources of supply and made 
separate provisions for other formations. The court concluded that the 
Commission’s denial of the application was in accord with general pooling 
law principles applicable at the time of the decision. In addition, the 
evidence here indicated that only the Woodford and its associated common 
sources of supply were “affected units.” Therefore, the Commission was 
found to have reached the correct result under the SRDA.   
                                                                                                                 
 177. The court noted that the phrase “affected unit” is not separately defined in the OKLA. 
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The decision of the Commission was affirmed. The court of appeals 
specifically stated in its concluding findings that its opinion was limited to 
the facts of the case. 
VIII. Other Energy Industry Cases 
A. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses objections to District Court 
approval of class settlements in the so-called “hot fuel”178 litigation. 
Proposed class action lawsuits continue to play a significant role in the 
energy and resources litigation field.  In In re Motor Fuel Temperature 
Sales Practices Litigation,179 the court was presented with multiple 
proposed class action suits in multiple states (later consolidated as 
multidistrict litigation) filed on behalf of consumers who purchased 
gasoline.  The suits alleged that the defendant retailers of gasoline failed to 
control for, or at least disclose, the effects of temperature on the energy 
value of a gallon of gasoline purchased at the gas pump.180 Several of the 
parties entered into class settlements approved by the district court.  The 
present appeals focused on the district court’s approval of the settlement 
agreements and its interpretation of one of the agreements.181  While the 
page limitations on this paper do not allow for a summary of the entire 
lengthy opinion of the Tenth Circuit, a number of the court’s rulings are of 
particular interest. 
First, in addressing an interpretational argument, the court considered the 
meaning and effect of the commonly-used phrase “including, without 
limitation.”  With respect to the use of that phrase in the paragraph of the 
settlement agreement at issue with one of the appellants’ arguments, the 
Tenth Circuit found: 
Under [State v. Larson, 184 Wash.2d 843, 365 P.3d 740 (2015)], 
we conclude that Section 4.7’s use of the phrase “including, 
without limitation” indicates [that the listed contract types 
provide] “illustrative examples” of the types of agreements that 
will trigger Section 4.7, “rather than an exhaustive list” of the 
agreements that will do so, 365 P.3d at 743.  But, under Larson, 
we likewise conclude that Section 4.7’s list of “illustrative 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Scott Cannon, “Attorneys fees ruling comes in ‘hot fuel,’” KANSAS CITY STAR 
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examples” nevertheless demonstrates an “inten[t] to limit the 
scope of” Section 4.7 to agreements that are “similar” to those 
examples. 365 P.3d at 743.  And, under Larson, we reach that 
conclusion despite the fact that Section 4.7 prefaces its list of 
illustrative examples with the phrase “including, without 
limitation.”182  
 Second, the court recognized the general rule that non-settling co-
defendants have no standing to object to a proposed class settlement, 
because “they lack ‘a legally protected interest in the settlement’ and 
therefore can’t satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.”183  However, 
the court found that a “‘[c]ourts have recognized a limited exception to this 
rule where non-settling parties can demonstrate they are ‘prejudiced’ by a 
settlement.’”184  The court noted that prejudice, in this context, “means 
‘plain legal prejudice’ as when the settlement strips the party of a legal 
claim or cause of action.”185  The Tenth Circuit concluded that plain legal 
prejudice had not been not shown by the non-settling appellants who made 
that assertion in this case. 
Third, an appellant presented a novel argument regarding the inclusion of 
go-forward provisions in the class settlements.  Appellant objected to the 
settlement agreements’ release provisions that enjoined settlement class 
members from suing the defendants for future actions taken by the 
defendants that were authorized or required by the settlement agreements.  
The appellant argued that if a plaintiff tried to sue defendants today alleging 
that their gasoline sales practices in future years would violate consumer 
law, the complaint would be dismissed as unripe.  But here, by calling the 
document a settlement agreement rather than a complaint, appellant 
contended that the court’s approval of the settlement agreements with their 
future-conduct releases constituted an improper advisory opinion violative 
of Article III standing principles.  The court declined to consider this 
argument for reasons described in the opinion.186 
As a final example of issues of interest discussed in the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision, appellants objected to provisions in certain of the settlement 
agreements under which defendants “agreed to convert pumps at its existing 
gas stations in certain states to Automatic Temperature Control (ATC) 
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pumps, and to install ATC pumps at its new gas stations in certain 
states.”187 Appellants argued: 
(1) regulators and policymakers have long debated requiring or 
authorizing ATC at retail but have ultimately “chosen not to,” . . 
. ; (2) selling gas by the gallon is lawful; (3) deciding whether to 
use ATC is a policy decision best left to the legislature; (4) the 
district court made an impermissible policy judgment about ATC 
when it found that class members would derive some benefit 
from the settlements to the extent that the settlements will 
increase the odds of conversion to ATC; (5) what the plaintiffs 
actually seek here is a change in the existing law, which is a 
political remedy, not a judicial one; and (6) the district court 
lacked authority to provide that political remedy under Article 
III.188 
The Tenth Circuit rejected this objection and noted that the lower court’s 
approval of the settlement agreements did not order states to require, or 
even to allow, conversion to ATC. Rather, that decision remains in the 
hands of state lawmakers.  The district court’s approval of the class 
settlements did not usurp the legislature’s role. 
The court affirmed the district court’s approval of the ten settlement 
agreements at issue in this appeal. 
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